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Environmental economists and policymakers often advocate market-based environmental 
regulatory regimes. While market-based regimes may be structured as Pigouvian taxes, other 
market-based regimes, such as tradable pollution permit regimes and conservation easements, 
rely upon private transactions in environmental degradation rights to achieve regulatory goals. In 
general, once the choice is made to adopt a non-tax-based regime, it is almost always the case 
that tax concerns are not discussed. Policymakers err, however, in viewing a choice against the 
use of an environmental tax regime as rendering tax concerns irrelevant. I argue that tax 
concerns, and tax structures, can have significant effects upon the function and ultimate success 
of non-tax market-based environmental regulatory regimes. To demonstrate this point, I consider 
the U.S. federal income tax treatment of two market-based environmental regulatory devices—
conservation easements and tradable pollution emission allowances. In particular, I argue that the 
current income tax treatment may frustrate the environmental goals of the devices. For example, 
donating or selling a conservation easement may result in the deferral or even the elimination of 
gains or losses. While the possibility of deferring or eliminating a gain may encourage property 
holders to sell or donate conservation easements—a result presumably consistent with 
environmental goals—it is also true that the deferral or elimination of a loss may discourage 
property holders from selling or donating conservation easements. And there is little reason to 
think that the presence of an unrealized gain (or loss) with respect to a piece of property 
correlates to desirability of obtaining a conservation easement with respect to that property. As 
an example on the tradable emission allowance side, the rules for establishing the tax basis in 
grandfathered emission allowances actually work to discourage the trading of permits. However, 
trading is key to tradable emission allowance regimes achieving their promise—improvement in 
environmental quality at the lowest possible cost. Thus, the tax structure frustrates the market for 
allowances, and with it the environmental goals of the regime. The notion that the tax treatment 
of market-based environmental regulatory devices should be evaluated from the perspective of 
environmental policy does not mean that tax policy concerns should be ignored or compromised. 
Neither, however, should environmental policy concerns. Moreover, environmental and tax 
policy concerns should be aligned to the extent that that is possible. 
 
